Unbundling dynamic capabilities: An exploratory study of continuous product innovation by Verona, G. & Ravasi, D.
Verona, G. & Ravasi, D. (2003). Unbundling dynamic capabilities: An exploratory study of 
continuous product innovation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 12(3), pp. 577-606. doi: 
10.1093/icc/12.3.577 
City Research Online
Original citation: Verona, G. & Ravasi, D. (2003). Unbundling dynamic capabilities: An exploratory 
study of continuous product innovation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 12(3), pp. 577-606. doi: 
10.1093/icc/12.3.577 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/4612/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Unbundling Dynamic Capabilities:
An Exploratory Study of Continuous Product Innovation*
Gianmario Verona
SDA Bocconi –  Bocconi University School of Management
Via Bocconi 8, Milano, Italy
Tel. (39) 02.5836.6522
E-mail: gianmario.verona@sdabocconi.it
Davide Ravasi
SDA Bocconi –  Bocconi University School of Management
Via Bocconi 8, Milano, Italy
Tel. (39) 02.5836.2540
E-mail: davide.ravasi@uni-bocconi.it
October, 2002
Second revision
Paper submitted to Industrial and Corporate Change (February, 2002) and accepted for
publication, subject to the revisions (July, 2002)
Unbundling Dynamic Capabilities:
An exploratory study of Continuous Product Innovation
In order to  better  understand  the  organizational  sources  of  continuous  innovation,  the  article
provides an in–depth analysis of Oticon A/S, a leading company in the hearing-aid industry which
showed an impressive ability to develop  new  products  in  the  Nineties.  Findings  highlight  that
dynamic capabilities are made up of: knowledge creation and absorption,  knowledge  integration,
and knowledge reconfiguration. Discussion links  the  findings  to  previous  literature  and  shows
how these knowledge-based processes are all based on a coherent mix of organizational resources.
Introduction
In recent years, the debate regarding organizational theory  and  strategy  has  shifted  from
the sustainability of  competitive  advantage  to  the  capacity  to  manage  innovation  and  change
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Tushman  and  O’Really,  1997;  Christensen,  1998).  Management
scholars have emphasized the virtues of product development in driving continuous  change.  New
products have been indicated as the most natural driving force behind change  and  renewal  at  the
corporate level (Dougherty, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Daneels, 2002). Introducing new products in the
market on a regular basis has been considered the most effective way  of  turning  change  into  an
endemic and continuous process (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1996). It has also been maintained that it
is mainly through the product development process that organizations perform their critical role of
integrating  dispersed  knowledge  of  a   different   nature   –   mainly,   scientific,   technological,
marketing - in an innovative  way  (Henderson  and  Cockburn,  1994;  Kogut  and  Zander,  1996;
Grant, 1996), and thus generate effective, new  knowledge  (Iansiti  and  Clark,  1994;  Helfat  and
Raubitschak, 2000). For this reason,  a  growing  number  of  studies  has  been  investigating  and
theorizing  about  the  strategies  and  structures  that  might  help  firms  acquire  the  capacity   to
continuously innovate by introducing new products.
Many of these studies point  to  company  resources  and  competencies  as  key  factors  in
understanding continuous innovation (Verona, 1999). In this connection, the “dynamic”  resource-
based  view  of  the  firm  identifies  dynamic  capabilities  as   the   main   source   of   sustainable
competitive advantage in  a  changing  competitive  landscape  (Teece  and  Pisano,  1994;  Teece,
Pisano,    Shuen,    1997).[1]    Dynamic     capabilities     are     defined     as     “the     subset     of
competence/capabilities which allow the firm to create new products and  processes,  and  respond
to  changing  market  circumstances”  (Teece,  Pisano,  Shuen,  1997,  p.  510).   These   processes
“specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release  resources,  use  resources  to
match and even create market change” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, p. 1107), and they  are  vital
to gaining and sustaining competitive advantage in industries  where  technology  and  the  market
change.
Despite their increasing relevance in several settings, in recent years  dynamic  capabilities
have been predominantly subject to theoretical debate  (Teece,  Pisano,  Shuen,  1997;  Eisenhardt
and  Martin,  2000;  Zollo  and  Winter,  2002).  Empirical  evidence  that  links  these  firm-based
processes to market and technology adaptation is still at an early stage[2]. Consequently, although
we now do have a clear understanding of the microeconomic evolution of industries in  periods  of
technological change and its impact on  the  dynamics  of  firms  (e.g.,  Abernathy  and  Utterback,
1978; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996), it is less clear  how  firms  actively
leverage their resources  to  shape  the  market  and  technological  trajectories  of  their  industries
through continuous  innovation.  Therefore,  how  firms  can  actually  develop  and  nurture  these
“second order” capabilities (Collis, 1994; Daneels, 2002) has not really  been  explained.  For  this
reason, the aim of this paper is to unbundle  the  very  concept  of  dynamic  capabilities  and  help
clarify the nature of the processes that really  foster  continuous  innovation  at  the  organizational
level in order to unravel the roots of product innovation sequencing.
In  order  to  do  this,  we  investigate  an  excellent  performer   and   outstanding   product
innovator in the hearing-aid industry, Oticon A/S. The considerable number of  new,  high-quality
products introduced by the multinational Danish company during the ‘90s clearly demonstrates its
capacity  to  develop  and  launch  new  products,  thus  providing  instructive   insights   to   better
understand the organizational basis of dynamic capabilities. The company has been widely studied
in   the   nineties,   although   previous   accounts   its   success   focused   mainly   on    innovative
organizational features (Peters, 1992) and the strategy-making process (Lovas and Goshal,  2000).
However,  in-depth  investigation  of  the  roots  of  Oticon’s  capacity  to  continuously   innovate
directed  us  beyond  traditional  explanations  and  highlighted  the   central   role   of   knowledge
integration and the related organizational processes.
Several studies have highlighted the knowledge-related processes that underlie  continuous
innovation.  Indeed,  new  products  rely  on  new  concepts  or  new   technologies   that   embody
knowledge of a different nature (Dougherty, 1992; Iansiti and Clark, 1994). Most of these  studies,
however, tend  to  focus  on  one  specific  knowledge-related  process.  For  instance,  some  have
observed the importance  of  combining  different  kinds  of  specialised  knowledge  into  product
development projects (e.g., Burgelman, 1991; Henderson, 1994;  Iansiti  and  Clark,  1994;  Grant,
1996). Others have highlighted the importance  of  a  periodic  reconfiguration  of  the  patterns  of
combined  knowledge  that  form  the  essence  of   products   and   strategies   (e.g.,   Brown   and
Eisenhardt,  1997;  Hargadon  and  Sutton,  1997;  Galunic  and  Rodan,   1998).   In   addition   to
demonstrating the fundamental knowledge-based nature of dynamic  capabilities,  the  findings  of
our  study  indicate  how  continuous  innovation  requires  the  simultaneous   presence   of   three
fundamental processes at the organizational level: knowledge creation and absorption,  knowledge
integration and knowledge reconfiguration (Figure 1). More specifically, at Oticon:
• knowledge creation and absorption reflects a long-term commitment to  the  investment  in
basic science, its potential technological  and  market  applications  and  the  creation  of  a
worldwide reputation in the scientific field in  order  to  also  absorb  knowledge  from  the
outside;
• knowledge integration refers to the capacity to shape and manage a context that  stimulates
latent and dispersed knowledge-resources, so that they can jointly contribute to developing
and launching new products;
•  knowledge  reconfiguration  regards  the  creation  of  an  “open”  structure  that  makes  it
possible to redefine role systems and relational patterns in a flexible way in order  to  make
it easier to continuously recombine  resources;  this  process  of  recombination  allows  the
company to keep the new product pipeline filled.
These three capabilities are the driving force behind the creation of new products which  revitalize
the company through continuous innovation. The findings of the empirical research also show that
dynamic  capabilities  tend  to  leverage  actors,  physical  resources,  structure  and  systems,   and
company culture. These four groups of resources are those that dynamic capabilities must use  and
leverage  in  order  to  generate  continuous  product  innovation.   Resources   must   be   coherent
internally in order to allow the capability to fulfill its function.
In presenting our findings, we  first  describe  the  research  methodology  and  discuss  the
environmental and competitive context in which the organizational changes at  Oticon  took  place
and displayed their effects. We subsequently provide and discuss evidence  of  the  three  dynamic
capabilities that fuel continuous innovation. The concluding section is devoted to  a  discussion  of
our findings where we point out the managerial implications of the model we propose and  discuss
its potential impact on  academic  research  in  the  field  of  continuous  innovation  and  dynamic
capabilities.
Research method
GIVEN  THE  EARLY  STAGE  OF   EMPIRICAL   RESEARCH   ON   DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES,   WE   FOLLOWED   THE   LOGIC   OF   GROUNDED   THEORY   BY
BUILDING OUR ANALYSIS ON AN  EXPLORATORY  CASE  STUDY  (GLASER  AND
STRAUSS, 1967;  MILES  AND  HUBERMAN,  1994).  THIS  METHOD  HAS  ALREADY
BEEN SUCCESSFULLY ADOPTED IN THE FIELD  OF  CONTINUOUS  INNOVATION
(BURGELMAN, 1991; LEONARD BARTON, 1995; BROWN  AND  EISENHARDT,  1997;
DANEELS,   2002)   AND   IS    CONSISTENT    WITH    THE    ISSUES    OF    THEORY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIELD OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES. THE ADOPTION  OF
A QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT  THAT
CAPABILITIES ARE PROCESSES AND PRESENTS AN  EMBEDDED  NATURE  (LEE,
1999). FOR EXAMPLE, HENDERSON  (1994)  OBSERVES  HOW  CAPABILITIES  ARE
TYPICALLY   THE   RESULT   OF    COMPLEX    PROCESSES    COMPRISING    THE
ACCUMULATION  OF  MINOR  DECISIONS  AND  ACTIONS  UNDERTAKEN   OVER
MANY YEARS IN A SITUATION  OF  GREAT  UNCERTAINTY.  THEREFORE,  THEY
ARE  VERY  DIFFICULT  TO  IDENTIFY  THROUGH  QUANTITATIVE   RESEARCH.
MOREOVER, EISENHARDT AND MARTIN (2000) OBSERVE THAT THE EMBEDDED
NATURE OF CAPABILITIES MAKES QUALITATIVE RESEARCH MORE  SUITABLE
THAN    ECONOMIC    AND    FORMAL    MODELING.     FINALLY,     ROUSE     AND
DAELLENBACH (1999) CONTEND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER  FOR  EMPIRICAL
STUDIES     ADOPTING     A     RESOURCE-BASED     APPROACH     TO      IDENTIFY
SIGNIFICANT  AND   HIGH   PERFORMING   STRATEGIC   GROUPS   IN   A   GIVEN
INDUSTRY  AND  ANALYZE  THE  SPECIFIC   SUCCESS   FACTORS   OF   LEADING
FIRMS THROUGH IN-DEPTH FIELD WORK, RATHER THAN RELYING ON  CROSS-
SECTIONAL   STUDIES   THAT   SEEM   LESS   SUITED    TO    STUDYING    ABOVE-
AVERAGE  PERFORMANCES  IN  AN  INDUSTRY.  ALTHOUGH  WE  ADMIT  THAT
FOCUSING ON ONE CASE MIGHT PREVENT US FROM APPLYING OUR  FINDINGS
ON A WIDER BASIS, WE  BELIEVE  THAT  THE  CONTRIBUTION  OF  OUR  STUDY
RESTS  MORE  ON  THE  ATTEMPT  TO  CONCRETELY  ANALYZE  A  CONCEPT  –
SUCH   AS   DYNAMIC   CAPABILITY   –   THAT   HAS   BEEN   THE    SUBJECT    OF
CONSIDERABLE    THEORETICAL    SPECULATION    BUT     SCANT     EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH, AND TO PROVIDE INSIGHTS ON  THE  DYNAMICS  OF  CONTINUOUS
INNOVATION.
Our  research  setting,  Oticon  A/S,  is  a  leading  producer  of   hearing   aids.   Following
Pettigrew (1990), Oticon was selected because of the high visibility  of  the  object  investigated  –
i.e. the capacity to sustain  impressive  continuous  innovation.  This  does  not  mean  that  Oticon
showed “unique” capabilities. As Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) state,  dynamic  capabilities  often
present commonalties among companies within the same industry. What is  relevant  is  that  these
capabilities definitely contributed to changing Oticon’s capacity to innovate and gain  competitive
advantage through innovation. As a matter of fact, in the ‘90s Oticon changed its performance and
can be cited as an outstanding innovator in the hearing aid industry (Lovas and Goshal, 2000).
In  the  early  ‘90s,  following  the  radical  reorganization  of  headquarter   activities,   the
company’s innovative  capacity  considerably  improved  and  Oticon  became  an  exemplary  and
widely studied case in turnaround management (Peters, 1992). Although for decades the  company
had played a leading role in the industry, at the end of the ‘80s its products largely depended  on  a
mature and declining technology and the company was  losing  ground  to  its  major  competitors,
Starkey and Siemens. Oticon’s market share plummeted from 14% to 9% in an  18-month  period,
causing the company to rank third on the market with balance sheets  showing  substantial  losses.
However,  in  1990  the  company  began  to  radically  reorganize  its  structure  and  systems  and
subsequently underwent a period of considerable growth also due  to  its  outstanding  capacity  to
innovate in products, technologies and services. The changes in the organizational structure aimed
to  develop  a  faster,  more  creative  and  efficient  company  that  could  benefit  from   the   new
technological changes affecting the industry with the advent of digital technology.
In the following years, the new product development schedule was cut by almost 50%. The
innovation rate, expressed in terms of proportion of sales due to new products, more than doubled,
and by 1993 half of Oticon’s  sales  were  already  accounted  for  by  products  introduced  in  the
previous two years (just before the change the corresponding figure was only 20%).  The  renewed
innovative  capacity  is   reflected   in   the   considerable,   sustained   improvement   in   financial
performance (see Table 1) obtained while structural dynamics in the hearing-aid  industry  became
increasingly   consolidated   and    concentrated.[3]    As    further    evidence    of    the    renewed
competitiveness of the company, at the end of the ‘90s, Oticon’s market share rose  once  again  to
about 15% of the global market and the company  led  the  development  of  a  new  generation  of
products based on digital technology.  Since  prior  events  are  generally  assumed  to  have  some
connection with those that follow, even though this connection may not be “neat and clear” (Miles
and Huberman, 1994, p. 145), we set out to explore to what extent the sweeping reorganization  of
the  company  might  be  plausibly  related  to  the  capacity  for  continuous  innovation   that   the
company displayed soon after.
Our study encompassed  in-depth  individual,  semi-structured  interviews  with  the  CEO,
members of the top management team, and other managers of the  Copenhagen  headquarters  and
the Italian subsidiary. Those interviewed included the  head  of  the  research  center,  most  of  the
senior management positions, and other researchers and managers directly involved in the projects
leading to  the  development  of  MultiFocus,  MicroFocus,  and  DigiFocus  –  three  of  the  most
successful innovations launched by the company  in  the  mid-‘90s.  We  selected  our  informants,
trying  to  balance  the  different  professional  areas,  and  different  levels  of  responsibility   and
seniority in order to gather and integrate a variety of perspectives. We also relied on  an  extensive
archival search that included financial  statements,  annual  reports,  internal  documents,  industry
publications, and other written material on the company.
The interviews began  by  asking  about  the  respondents’  background  and  the  role  they
played in the organization. We also asked them about changes made in the organization at the  end
of the ‘80s and how this  affected  their  activities.  We  subsequently  focused  on  the  process  of
product development in order to identify the  different  activities  required  to  manage  continuous
innovation. The respondents were first asked to  describe  the  structure  of  the  process  and  their
specific roles and were then asked to provide  detailed  examples,  charts,  and  documents  and  to
elaborate further on their statements. They were asked to furnish their own  explanation  regarding
the overall improvement in the product development rate and why it was so effective. We  tried  to
leave the questions as open as possible. Since  we  did  not  want  to  impose  our  own  theoretical
frame of reference on our informants’ interpretations, we carefully avoided referring  explicitly  to
concepts like “dynamic capabilities” or “continuous innovation”. We stopped  interviewing  when
the saturation point was reached, that is, when additional questions would not have added much to
our understanding of the phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The first set of  interviews  took
place in July 1997. Two subsequent follow-up interviews were held to collect  further  data,  solve
minor discrepancies and submit our tentative interpretations to our informants. The first  one  took
place a few months after the first set of interviews and the second in January 2000.
Data analysis followed the general guidelines for grounded theory  (Miles  and  Huberman,
1994; Lee, 1999). The analysis  was  initially  conducted  independently  by  the  two  authors  and
combined with the results of the archival collection. Our aim was to  build  on  and  move  beyond
our informants’ descriptions in an attempt to interpret facts and information and integrate them  in
an emerging theoretical framework. Although the process followed a sequential path, results  from
each stage were adjusted and further developed as additional sets of data made  us  reconsider  and
revise our interpretations in order to improve the fit between the tentative framework and the data.
This iterative approach is consistent with the general prescription for grounded theory building  to
interpret data on a continual and evolving basis (Lee, 1999).
We began our analysis by  looking  for  core  categories  that  could  explain  the  observed
phenomenon – i.e. the substantial increase in the company’s innovative capacity.  By  building  on
insightful  remarks  from  some  of  our  informants,  we  selected  knowledge  integration   as   an
effective general framework to guide our  interpretation.  The  concept  of  knowledge  integration
appropriately describes the essential feature of innovation in the  hearing-aid  industry.  A  hearing
aid is basically made up of simple components (a  transducer,  an  amplifier,  etc.)  developed  and
produced by external suppliers. Therefore, a new hearing aid requires  the  innovative  redesign  of
the architecture that combines these  standard  components.[4]  Our  attention  then  turned  to  the
capabilities that underpinned the company’s increased capacity to integrate distributed knowledge.
Following the above-mentioned definition of capabilities, we focused on organizational processes,
starting with  those  that  were  more  directly  affected  by  the  reorganization  that  preceded  the
considerable improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency  of  the  new  product  development
process. Our search  initially  focused  on  the  features  of  the  new  organizational  structure  and
systems to  investigate  how  they  affected  the  process  of  knowledge  integration.[5]  However,
following our informants’ accounts, we soon realized that  the  new  organizational  context  alone
could not completely explain the renewed ability to  innovate.  What  the  new  structure  had  also
accomplished was to facilitate the refinement and exploitation of the  scientific  and  technological
innovation that was taking place  in  the  research  center.  In  addition  to  focusing  on  the  major
processes affected by the reorganization, we also had  to  study  the  research  process  in  order  to
better study the company’s innovative capacity. Furthermore, there seemed to be something  more
than simple knowledge integration in the renewed capacity to  continuously  innovate.  Constantly
producing new knowledge of a scientific and technical nature while at  the  same  time  preserving
the capacity to periodically change the dominant  patterns  of  knowledge  combination  –  i.e.  the
architecture of the products – seemed to be just as important in supporting continuous innovation.
After having identified the fundamental processes/capabilities that underpinned continuous
innovation,  we  tracked   the   activities,   decision   and   structural   features   considered   to   be
fundamental. We drew detailed causal network maps (Miles and Huberman, 1994)  of  the  events,
activities and environmental conditions that our informants explicitly or implicitly associated with
the three fundamental capabilities identified in the previous phase. Further  sets  of  collected  data
helped us identify the changes that had made the  transition  to  the  new  organization  easier,  that
became essential blocks of the displayed capacity  to  continuously  innovate.  These  fundamental
elements were  later  grouped  into  four  categories  –  actors,  physical  resources,  structures  and
systems, and culture – linked, although in different ways, to the knowledge-related  activities  that
represents the essence of dynamic capabilities. This grouping did not only  emerge  from  the  data
but was consistent with the idea that  capabilities  are  processes  that  leverage  specific  resources
(Leonard  Barton,  1994;  Grant,  1996;  Eisenhardt  and  Martin,  2000).   While  the  actors  bring
individual specialized knowledge embedded in  skills  and  expertise,  the  physical  resources  and
infrastructures, such as  a  comprehensive  library  on  acoustics  and  audiology  or  the  corporate
electronic archive containing  virtually  all  the  codified  information  of  the  company,  represent
collective repositories of codified knowledge. Structures and systems  (roles,  incentives,  etc.)  on
the  one  hand,  and  the  organizational  culture  (values,  norms  –  in  other   words,   the   set   of
collectively shared knowledge structures) on the other, contribute  to  defining  the  organizational
context that guides people’s behavior and affect knowledge flows in the company.
In the next paragraph, we will first briefly  describe  the  environmental  context  in  which
Oticon’s strategic changes occurred and then give an account  of  how  the  company  was  able  to
pioneer the development of technology in the industry. We will subsequently describe and discuss
the  fundamental  building  blocks  of  the  dynamic  capability  that  underpin  Oticon’s  ability  to
continuously innovate and upgrade its product range.
Technology development and product innovations in the hearing aid industry
A hearing aid is an instrument that filters and amplifies sounds so  that  a  person  can  hear
better. The most  common  types  of  hearing  aids  are  behind-the-ear  (BTE)  -  external  devices
connected to a soft plastic ear-mold which fits inside the ear -, in-the-ear (ITE)  -fitted  completely
in the outer ear-, and in-the-canal (ITC) - similar to in-the-ear  hearing  aids  except  that  they  are
smaller and fit mainly in the ear canal -. No matter what the size or style, all hearing aids have  the
same basic components: a microphone, an  amplifier,  a  receiver,  and  a  battery  for  power.  The
microphone transforms sound into an electrical signal and sends it to the amplifier.  The  amplifier
increases the amplitude of the electrical signal; filters and  volume  or  tone  controls  may  further
modify the signal. The amplified signal is transmitted to the receiver where it is  transformed  into
sound.
Until the early ‘90s, all hearing aids were based on an analog/adjustable circuitry where all
the  amplification  parameters  (such  as  gain,  frequency  response  and  maximum  output)  were
controlled  by  fixed  or  variable  components  in  the  hearing  aid.  Based  on   a   comprehensive
audiological evaluation of hearing, the basic features  of  analog/adjustable  hearing  aid  operation
were   specified   by   the   audiologist   and   installed   in    the    laboratory.    In    recent    years,
analog/programmable  hearing  aid  circuits  have  become  extremely  popular;  they  differ   from
analog/adjustable hearing aids in the way audiologists can modify both basic and  fine  parameters
of  instrument  performance.  At  the  time  of   fitting,   analog/programmable   hearing   aids   are
connected to a computer, which is used to set the  various  basic  and  fine  parameters.  The  latest
generation, however, is the digitally programmable hearing aids, introduced in the market in 1996.
These devices represent a  substantial  improvement  over  previous  technology  in  that  they  are
extremely  flexible,  can  be  fine-tuned,  and  have  advanced   compression   (loudness   limiting)
capabilities. Digitization means that incoming sounds are converted into numbers, which are  then
analyzed and manipulated through a set of algorithms programmed into  the  chip  which  controls
the hearing aid. The computerized digital aid  analyzes  incoming  sound,  makes  a  determination
regarding speech  versus  noise  content  and  then  converts  this  information  into  numbers.  The
resultant digitized numbers are subsequently manipulated according to the algorithm  instructions,
reconverted to an analog form (sound  waves)  and  delivered  to  the  ears  without  producing  the
types of distortion commonly associated with analog technology hearing aids.
Recent developments in the basic technology of hearing aids  are  punctuated  by  Oticon’s
products (Table 2). MultiFocus in  1992,  MicroFocus  in  1995  and  DigiFocus  in  1996  marked
substantial advances in the technology and design of hearing aids. MultiFocus  introduced  a  fully
automatic system for adjusting  amplification  and  tonal  balance  according  to  the  frequency  of
sounds (whereas traditional hearing aids used to amplify weak  sounds  as  much  as  loud  sounds,
high-frequencies as much as low frequencies so  that  people  had  to  keep  adjusting  the  volume
control). Although relying on electronic circuitry  for  sound  processing,  MultiFocus  technology
was still based on analog amplification. In 1995, MicroFocus applied the knowledge  gained  from
MultiFocus   to   a   cosmetically   attractive   ITC   instrument   that   marked   the   transition    to
analog/programmable  hearing  aids.  MicroFocus,  in  fact,   incorporated   some   of   the   digital
technology that would later be fully applied to DigiFocus since it could  be  programmed  to  filter
sounds according to the patients’ specific impairment as well as their preference for sound  quality
factors and specific communicative contexts. In 1996, the  introduction  of  DigiFocus  redesigned
the basic architecture of the product and opened up a  fast-growing  and  highly-profitable  market
segment. Digital hearing aids already account for a considerable  share  of  the  worldwide  market
and are bound to replace analog ITE hearing aids as the dominant design  (Business  Week,  1999).
DigiFocus was programmed to reproduce  sounds  in  an  entirely  new  way:  sounds  of  different
frequency  could  be  processed  separately  and  the  amplification  could  be  constantly  adjusted
according to changes in  the  external  environment.  DigiFocus  could  therefore  improve  speech
understanding in a wider variety of situations, including noisy environments. As Oticon pioneered
the new digital technology, it further eroded the market shares of  its  larger  competitors,  Starkey
and Siemens. In the meantime, in fact, the two companies were still exploring the  possibilities  of
the new technologies: their first digital products were released only two years later.
During these years, the company paced the rate of innovation by also introducing  products
that,  without  altering  the  basic  technological  architecture,  incorporated  incremental   changes
regarding aesthetic appeal, size and ease of handling. All  this  exploited  the  potential  of  current
design and made the hearing aids appeal more to  specific  target  groups.  The  Personic  line,  for
instance, was offered in a variety of colors similar to those of  electronic  devices  so  that  hearing
aids were no longer  regarded  as  a  mark  of  a  physical  handicap  but  as,  in  the  Ceo’s  words,
“modern communication systems that reflect the user’s personality, hair-style and life-style.”  The
company even designed a special line for  hearing-impaired  children  called  Oticon  4  Kids.  The
device had a colorful and  original  look  and  presented  in  a  specially  designed  package  which
contained information material meant to reduce  the  psychological  burden  of  having  to  wear  a
hearing aid at a young age.
As we anticipated in the methodology section, the impressive flow of  product  innovations
introduced in the ‘90s is in sharp contrast with the substantial lack of new products in the previous
decade when the company was exploiting on a mature and  declining  technology,  BTE,  and  was
lagging behind in the development of more modern and appealing ITE devices. The turning  point
can be traced back to the organizational transformation, which affected the corporate headquarters
in 1990 and soon  after  the  rest  of  the  global  organization.  Dismantling  the  formal  structures
regulating the hierarchical relations and the task-system  was  the  essence  of  the  transformation.
Departments, positions, titles, and job  descriptions  were  abolished  and  the  previous  functional
structure was replaced with a project-based  organization.  Functional  activities  were  re-grouped
across projects and processes, which substituted  departments  as  centers  of  coordination.  These
radical  changes  seem  to  have  created  a  favorable  context  for  the  development  of   dynamic
capabilities that were reflected in the continuous flow of new products.  Evidence from  our  study
suggests that these capabilities rest  on  the  simultaneous  presence  of  three  processes  regarding
knowledge creation and absorption, knowledge integration, and knowledge reconfiguration. In the
following sections, these three essential processes will be presented and discussed by showing  the
set of structures  and  resources  they  build  upon  and  their  relations  with  Oticon’s  capacity  to
continuously innovate.
Knowledge creation and absorption
The creation of a hearing instrument draws upon two scientific  fields,  namely,  audiology
and acoustics. The two sciences  provide  the  basic  knowledge  of  the  way  hearing  instruments
work. The  excellence  of  the  Danish  competitors  in  the  hearing-aid  industry  –  together  with
Oticon, the Copenhagen-based Widex and Danavox account for about  one-fourth  of  world  sales
(Lee and Lotz, 1998)– is often ascribed to the development of  the  Danish  educational  system  in
these two scientific fields. Denmark’s long tradition of  research  and  education  in  acoustics  and
audiology was, in fact, boosted in 1953 by the  Danish  government’s  decision  to  provide  a  free
hearing aid to anyone who needed it. In this connection, just as US based computer firms  strongly
benefited from hiring Ph.D.s from American graduate schools (Iansiti, 1997),  Danish  hearing-aid
producers  strengthened  their  global  competitive  position  by  employing   well-trained   Danish
university graduates. However, developing a hearing aid is not  solely  based  on  these  two  basic
sciences. Helping impaired people hear, in fact, is not simply a  matter  of  amplification.  What  is
crucially important is the way a person perceives sounds,  something  which  is,  in  turn,  strongly
influenced by a person’s lifestyle and surrounding environment. In this regard, the aid  of  psycho-
acoustics is fundamental in guiding  research  about  the  architecture  of  the  product.  Since  it  is
based on considerable fieldwork, psycho-acoustic research differs from research undertaken in the
related areas of  audiology  and  acoustics,  in  that  it  requires  constant  interaction  with  hearing
impaired people in order to identify and measure their specific reactions to various sound stimuli.
Until the late ‘70s, Oticon followed the usual pattern commonly adopted in the hearing  aid
industry of integrating basic research with  technology  development  in  a  specific  Research  and
Development department. Researchers employed by hearing aid  firms,  in  fact,  usually  have  an
engineering background that enables them to deal with the acoustic or electro-acoustic  aspects  of
product development. At Oticon, such a  model  became  a  source  of  major  problems  since  the
development activities were so time consuming that  the  R&D  people  spent  most  of  their  time
solving minor technological problems; this was especially true in cases when there was little  time
left before the product was to be  put  on  the  market.  Therefore,  the  creation  of  new  scientific
knowledge did not receive due attention. As the Director of the Oticon Research Center remarked:
This habit took over more and more and, in the end, it was always long-term research which
was neglected. So, it was decided that if we really wanted to have long-term research  it  had
to be established away from the rest of the company.
This problem, together with the promising discoveries made in the emerging  field  of  psycho-acoustics,  led
Oticon executives to consider establishing an in-house research center as a strategic opportunity for  the  development
of new products. Therefore, in 1975, a research center located in  Eriksholm  (about  50  miles  from  the  Copenhagen
headquarters) was opened and equipped with the most advanced technologies and infrastructures including one of  the
world’s most comprehensive libraries on audiology and acoustics  and  hearing  instruments.  Since  that  time  twelve
researchers work full-time with hearing-impaired patients in  order  to  carry  out  research  on  ways  to  develop  new
scientific knowledge.
There  are  nine  hundred  and  fifty  hearing  impaired  people  involved   in   a   long-term
relationship. The very decision to locate the research facility in a pleasant resort in the countryside
outside Copenhagen was designed to encourage these patients (who come to the laboratory at least
three times a year) to participate in the field experiment. Moreover,  in  order  to  further  reinforce
this  commitment  to  basic  research,  a  unique  museum  focusing  on   the   history   of   hearing
instruments has been recently built. The Eriksholm Collection includes over five hundred hundred
hearing instruments which trace the technological history of the industry.
The fact that the researchers dedicated their time, attention and effort exclusively  to  basic
research created a favorable environment for the development of scientific knowledge which often
led to development projects. The scientific knowledge developed  at  Eriksholm  often  provides  a
fundamental input to the conception and design  of  innovative  products.  As  a  senior  researcher
said:
What we do here is psychoacoustic  research  with  hearing  impaired  subjects.  We  are  not
making major discoveries with new technologies or new production methods. We  are  more
interested in creating the knowledge on how a new hearing aid should function: what should
be  the  functionality  of  it  –  not  how  that  functionality  should  come  about,  nor  which
technology should  be  used.  That  is  in  the  sole  hands  of  the  development  units  at  the
headquarters.   (…)  Our  responsibility  is  to  ascertain  that  we  can  come  up   with   new
principles of what a new hearing aid should do: not how it is  constructed,  but  its  function,
what it does when the sound passes through it.
The establishment of a  separate  research  facility  also  increased  the  capacity  to  absorb  knowledge  from
external sources. In fact, a distinctive characteristic of the research site is  the  broad  autonomy  researchers  enjoy  in
terms of fields and line of inquiry.  Unless  specifically  related  to  new  product  development,  scientific  knowledge
produced at Eriksholm is shared with the rest of  the  scientific  and  academic  community:  Oticon’s  researchers  are
encouraged to publish in academic journals as well as participate in the major international scientific conferences.  As
a consequence, Eriksholm gradually came to be widely regarded as a scientific research center, operating in  the  field
of audiology, acoustics and psycho-acoustic. As the Director of the center said:
In some way, Oticon has succeeded  in  turning  this  place  in  many  people’s  mind  into  a
research center, not an industrial related facility.  They  do  not  see  the  industrial  company
when they come here - they see a research center like the one they have at home. (…)  When
we go out talking in some scientific meetings, we never ever  talk  about  products.  We  talk
about measurement principles, evaluation principles, how  to  construct  a  questionnaire  for
hearing impaired etc. - not about the outcome or evaluation of a specific product. People  are
sure that we are not going to give a business talk. So, over the  last  five  years  people  have
stopped to be picky about the fact  that  we  are  related  to  a  business.   Researchers  at  the
University do not mind doing research with us any more. Ten years ago it was  impossible  -
they did not want to be ‘entangled with a greedy industrial company’!
This reputation is good for Oticon since it helps the company to acquire knowledge in several ways. First,  in
conjunction with the Danish government, the company co-sponsors Ph.D. students in a  specific  program-  called  the
Industrial Ph.D. Educational Scheme. According to the Scheme, a group of about three  students  is  employed  in  the
company for the entire period of the Ph.D. program.  Students are required to take courses related to their  business  or
activity, such as project management or product development. The ideas they develop for their thesis are  often  tested
and developed and might lead to improvements in existing product lines.
The firm also works closely with university  centers.  For  example,  a  Swedish  university
carried out two Ph.D. projects that were an integral part of the work that led to the functionality  at
the basis of DigiFocus. Other formal cooperation agreements have been stipulated with schools  in
the UK and the US. Moreover, in 1997, the research  department  introduced  an  annual  series  of
seminars, chaired by outstanding scholars  in  the  field  of  psycho-acoustic.  The  seminars  bring
together scientists from all over the world who carry out research on psycho-acoustics.
More  unconventional  collaborations  may  be  established  for   individual   projects.   For
example, the development of the DigiFocus line was based  on  a  device  called  Jump-1,  initially
developed for field research. The basic  feature  of  this  device  was  that  it  could  access  all  the
parameters that were usually fixed in analog instruments. The  firm  involved  fifteen  laboratories
located around the world and gave them the experimental hearing aid for their own research. They
were invited to come over and attend a seminar on the use  and  potentialities  of  the  new  device.
The only thing they were asked to do was to keep the company informed on how the research  and
experimentation progressed. If the company subsequently thought that the  research  project  could
turn into something that could in some way be patented or marketed, Oticon would be offered  the
first right of refusal.
The  long-term  focus  on  basic  research  makes  Eriksholm  an  important  center  for  the
advancement of scientific knowledge in the fields of  audiology  and  psycho-acoustics.  At  times,
however,  scientific  research  also  leads  to  technological  development.   Specific   technologies
designed to investigate hearing disorders do not exist and scientists need to produce these  devices
by themselves. For  instance,  both  MultiFocus  and  DigiFocus  were  not  initially  conceived  as
products but as experimental devices for specific field tests on noise reduction  that  could  not  be
done with the traditional analog technology. In these cases, the need to obtain the data for the field
test led to creating systems that eventually led to new generations of products.
To sum up, evidence from our study emphasizes the impact  of  long-term  commitment  to
scientific  research  (conducted  in  a   separate   entity   loosely   connected   to   the   rest   of   the
organization),  which  makes  it  possible  to  develop  and  acquire   specialized   knowledge.   By
exclusively devoting its efforts to reaserch in the scientifc field  with  no  specific  limitations  and
gaining  acess  to  external  networks  of  knowledge  production  enhanced  Oticon’s  capacity   to
pioneer technology evolution in the  industry.  Figure  2  maps  the  resources  and  structures  that
underpin this capability, such as unique repositories of knowledge like the Eriksholm library,  and
a staff of high-skilled researchers and long-term relationships with  a  pool  of  loyal  patients  that
constantly  take  part  to  field-testing.  Also,  the  structural  separation   of   the   research   center
facilitated  the  establishment  of  an  organizational  culture  that  valued   academic   recognition,
encouraged  autonomous  pursue  of  research  paths,  and   promoted   participation   to   scientific
international meetings. Eventually, the physical  and  substantial  autonomy  of  Eriksholm  helped
Oticon to develop a worldwide reputation  as  an  outstanding  producer  of  scientific  knowledge,
facilitating cooperation both at the individual level – by attracting students and scientists  from  all
over the world – and at  the  institutional  one  –  establishing  ongoing  collaborations  with  other
universities and research centers. As the Director of the center put it:
If you open up and trust you will be trusted and information will be shared with you.  If  you
do not you will not get anything.
At the same  time,  as  we  will  discuss  in  more  details  in  the  following  sections,  the  center  maintained  a  loose
connection with the development units  ensuring  that  scientific  and  technological  breakthroughs  could  be  quickly
applied to the development  of  new  products.  While,  in  fact,  experimentation  and  field  testing  at  the  Eriksholm
research center had produced important insights in the perception of hearing impairments  and  innovative  devices  in
the elaboration and amplification of sounds, most of this knowledge lay underutilized in the research labs. It was  only
after the establishment of the new project-based organization that market application of  this  accumulated  knowledge
were quickly identified leading to commercial successes like MultiFocus.
Knowledge integration
Some of  the  new  product  lines  introduced  by  Oticon  during  the  ‘90s  were  based  on
incremental innovations developed on the spontaneous initiative of engineers and marketers at  the
company headquarters. For instance, the MultiFocus  product  line  was  initially  developed  by  a
group of engineers who had worked on the original project. Thanks to their  research,  the  hearing
aid was made smaller, the design improved and the original BTE product transformed into an  ITE
version. They also  contributed  to  the  development  of  a  miniature-size  canal  hearing  aid,  the
MicroFocus, that benefited from the state-of-the-art technology without substantially  altering  the
core concept and hearing-aid functions.
Up until the end of the ‘80s, however, product development at Oticon had adopted a  rather
different, sequential approach. Researchers  provided  the  basic  inputs,  engineers  developed  the
actual product and then handed it over to  the  marketing  department.  The  increasingly  complex
technology used to create the product made the sequential process unable to meet the  competitive
requirements introduced by the emergent digital technology and  the  increasing  competition.  For
these reasons, a more organic architecture was implemented  in  order  to  increase  the  speed  and
efficiency of transferring ideas and concepts across the organization. The new architecture,  called
Integrated Product Development, is organized around a series of cross-functional project teams  in
charge of single development projects.
Interdepartmental barriers have been removed so that departments and positions no  longer
exist.  Most  employees   are   now   grouped   together   in   so-called   “professional   areas”   and
“competence centers”, which have  replaced  the  old  functional  organization.  Most  professional
areas  do  not  correspond  to  the  old  departments  and  their   boundaries   are   loosely   defined.
Competence centers, such as Integrated Circuit or Mechanical Engineering, are  groups  of  people
sharing specific technological skills. A basic principle underlying the new structure  is  that  if  the
company is to take full advantage of the potential contribution of each group member, jobs  would
be designed to fit each person, and not the other way around. As one member of  the  development
group remarked:
One of the reasons why we have abolished the concept of  departments  is  that  departments
tend to close you in: good engineers,  for  example,  may  also  possess  very  good  skills  in
some particular aspects of marketing. Project groups provide  an  opportunity  for  people  to
exercise skills of different kinds: people may not use their skills to one hundred per cent, but
they surely use them more than in a traditional structure where they are  discouraged  to  use
them outside their department.
Coordination  within  professional  areas  and  competence  centers  are  achieved   through
“professional  managers”  who  are  in  charge  of  obtaining  physical,  technological  and  human
resources for the product development  process.  They  are  responsible  for  selecting,  hiring  and
training people and coordinating the development of internal skills in order to maintain sources  of
competencies for the different projects. They are also responsible for the acquisition and  in-house
development  of  technology  in  their  specific   area.   Technical   knowledge   developed   within
competence centers is then  applied  to  a  continuous  activity  of  technical  problem-solving  and
product upgrading that  goes  on  within  projects.  As  the  coordinator  of  the  Integrated  Circuit
Component Center said:
Projects  have  their  own  “domain”  of  innovation  -  innovation  in  the  integrated   circuit
component takes place in the integrated circuit -competence center. We develop and provide
building blocks for the integrated circuits so that innovation in the projects does not have  to
take care of it. If you look at the commonalties between the needs  of  the  different  projects
you realize that 50% to 90% of the content is really the same, just put together in a  different
fashion; therefore, it really pays to devote some effort to optimizing component design.
Professional managers are also responsible  for  making  sure  that  specialized  knowledge  circulates  and  is
transferred across projects. People belonging to competence centers and  professional  areas  meet  weekly  to  discuss
issues of general interest in order  to  make  sure  that  all  the  members  can  benefit  and  learn  from  the  experience
acquired in individual projects.
While  competence  centers  and  professional  groups  represent   sources   of   specialized
knowledge, the integration of this knowledge actually takes place in development projects. At  the
start  of  any  project,  a  team  is  formed  and  the  members  work  together  until  the  project   is
completed. For example, all project groups dealing with new product development have to include
at  least  one  person  from  the  research  center,  one  or  more  engineers   from   the   technology
development units as well as persons with a background in audiology, marketing, and so on. Team
members are relatively free to decide whether to take part in a project or not and how   to  allocate
their time among different projects. In this sense, people are not assigned  on  a  hierarchical  basis
but are encouraged to participate according to their skills  and  interests.  Everyone  is  responsible
for developing a job portfolio - corresponding to the activities performed in the different projects -
according to the person’s attitudes, skills, and personal aspirations. As the CEO remarked:
In this organization you can’t do central planning: you need to create a framework in  which
it takes place (...). We create this framework by stimulating open communication as much as
possible. Usually the resource conflicts are very  clear  to  the  people  involved  and  if  they
have all  the  information,  then  they  are  the  ones  who  can  best  solve  them.  They  may
occasionally make the wrong decision, but  I’m  sure  that  a  central  manager  would  make
more wrong decisions.
People are also encouraged to feel responsible for the entire project not only by applying their  specific  skills
but also by contributing to solving the problems  arising  during  the  various  phases  of  the  project.  Our  informants
agreed that the new project-based organization has led to increased interaction across levels  and  professional  groups
so that it is easier to exchange ideas and integrate specialized  skills.  Even  communication  problems  and  traditional
bickering between departments have gradually disappeared.
The new structure  requires  most  employees  to  perform  different  activities  in  different
projects some of which lie outside their formal competence or education. Such an  unconventional
job system has a considerable impact on how jobs are perceived. On the one hand, people have  to
value professional growth and personal challenge more than career  advancement  since  there  are
no formal career plans and paths. Indeed, the absence of  a  hierarchy  makes  a  traditional  career
impossible; people see  a  salary  increase  based  on  individual  contributions  and  results  and  a
potential redefinition of their role according to the skills they  develop  and  the  opportunities  the
organization provides. On the other hand, the absence of a clear structure requires a willingness to
work in a fundamentally ambiguous environment. In order to ensure  that  employees  possess  the
flexibility such a system requires, recruiting is based not only on  professional  skills  but  also  on
attitudes and life experience. Oticon tries  to  hire  people  with  different  backgrounds  and  gives
them a great deal of freedom in the company. A  candidate  with  an  “unconventional”  resume  is
considered more likely to adapt to the  new  structure  than  a  candidate  with  a  traditional  MBA
education. As a senior manager involved in global policies told us:
Usually, companies have specific problems and hire people trained to solve those  problems.
On the contrary, at Oticon, we like to  hire  people  with  different  skills.  If  I  need  to  hire
somebody that helps me deal with accounting, I also  want  him  to  know  something  about
marketing, because sooner or later he may be involved in that. That is the reason  why  we’d
rather hire people with heterogeneous experience.
The integration of specialized individual knowledge is also facilitated  by  the  absence  of  physical  barriers.
The new working environment consists of an open space filled with similar workstations based on a drawer-less  desk
equipped with computer, telephone and fax. Everyone has a  "trolley"  -  a  personal  file-cabinet  on  wheels  -  and  is
encouraged to freely move around the  common  workstations,  changing  location  according  to  the  specific  project
work. For instance, when we interviewed the CEO, he said that at that  time  he  was  working  almost  full-time  on  a
marketing project. We could actually see his trolley parked around a group  of  desks  where  people  were  discussing
how to price a new product. Moreover, the cafeteria and tea-and-coffee buffets on every floor  are  common  meeting-
places where employees exchange new ideas. .
Knowledge integration is further facilitated by easy access to the  stock  of  organizational,
codified knowledge. A new electronic archive gives  every  employee  easy  and  direct  access  to
virtually any available company information including market  reports,  quality  assurance  results,
technical documentation, and so on. Only the minutes  of  the  Board  and  salary  information  are
kept confidential. All the physical documents were initially scanned in the corporate data  base  so
that they could be easily retrieved. In this connection, the CEO said:
We use paper a lot but we try to avoid filing paper: filing is all made in the computer system
either scanned in or directly typed in. Having all the information accessible in  an  electronic
archive is important because if the information is kept in physical files in closed office,  it  is
accessible only in theory, not in practice. In our case, no matter were you sit, it is accessible.
You can flexibly move around.
To sum up, even though knowledge creation and absorption represent the pre-requisite  for
innovation,  what  triggers  the  dynamic  process  of  continuous  innovation  is  the  capability  of
integrating the specialized knowledge dispersed in company. At Oticon, this capability rests  on  a
fluid project-based organization that fosters the development of individual potential, improves  the
capacity to tap individual knowledge and ideas, and institutionalize the spontaneous and collective
contribution to product innovation.  The  resources  and  structures  that  underpin  the  process  of
knowledge integration and that are above-mentioned in our description are shown in Figure 3. The
increased  interaction  and  exchanges  between  experts  from  different   professional   areas,   the
establishment  of  an  integrated  product  development  process  combined  with  the   absence   of
physical and structural barriers all stem from a corporate policy that strives  to  integrate  different
skills and expertise into new product development initiatives.
Knowledge reconfiguration
Retrospective  descriptions  of  company  operations  in  the  ‘70s  and  ‘80s   indicate   the
existence  of  a  marked  informal  professional   hierarchy   with   technicians   and   development
engineers well above the marketing and sales personnel.  Engineers  were  regarded  as  crucial  to
maintaining Oticon’s leading market share especially considering their expertise in advanced BTE
technology. However, as the market changed, that technology gradually  became  less  appropriate
to the emerging needs. It was not long before the very same  core  technological  competence  that
had led Oticon to reach its dominant position in the market proved to  be  a  major  impediment  to
the development of a new product  architecture.  The  technician-dominated  management  offered
little support to the development of the new technology. Instead, Oticon  decided  to  reinforce  its
core  technologies  and  continued  to  invest  its  resources   in   analogue   BTE   products:   as   a
consequence, the development of ITEs came to a halt. As the ITE segment grew  during  the  ‘80s,
the company found itself tied to an old system while the development of the  technologies  needed
to satisfy market demand lagged behind. In other words,  its  core  competence  had  become  very
rigid. This made it impossible to develop and establish new capabilities and reorganize  a  product
architecture based on different functional and technological premises.  The  presence  of  a  rigidly
defined hierarchy of jobs and positions  based  on  tradition  and  professional  prestige  ultimately
inhibited the development of knowledge outside the established domains.
However, in the first few years after the change, Oticon rapidly introduced  major  changes
in the architecture of the product, none of them apparently posing any obstacle  to  the  subsequent
reorganization of existing knowledge and competencies into  other  innovative  products.  In  other
words, the company displayed a capability to periodically  reorganize  the  patterns  of  knowledge
integration  that  underlay   its   product   technologies.   In   part,   this   capability   rests   on   the
indeterminacy of the role system that leaves the structure more open to  periodic  redefinition  and
allows patterns of cooperation and communication to evolve over time  as  new  products  become
established and project teams evolve into product management structures  that  do  not  overlap  or
replace  those  that  already  exist  but  co-exist  with  them.  The  “multi-job”  system,   the   loose
affiliation to professional areas, the absence of physical constraints to mobility, the free  allocation
of time, skills and attention are all elements that, besides facilitating  the  integration  of  dispersed
individual knowledge, contribute to preserving the capacity to reorganize patterns  of  cooperation
and knowledge integration embodied in products and activities.
The loosely-coupled nature of the new organization, however, is offset  by  the  centralized
coordination  of  the  various  development  projects  and  initiatives  performed   by   a   so-called
“development group”. The development group is composed of seven senior managers -  the  CEO,
the head of the Eriksholm research  group  and  the  coordinators  of  Quality  Assurance,  Product
Development,  and  Marketing  and  Audiology  activities.  The  development  group  is  the   only
hierarchical structure that has been maintained and is sometimes referred to as a sort of  “board  of
directors” for the different projects. The development group’s main responsibilities are  evaluating
new  project  initiatives,  allocating  financial  resources  among  new  and  ongoing  projects   and
periodically  monitoring  them.  The  development  group  sets  and  communicates   the   strategic
priorities of the company at monthly information meetings.  Priorities  are  discussed  with  all  the
employees and project proposals are evaluated according to these priorities.
The evaluation process is kept as simple and informal as possible. A member of  the  group
– a VP coordinating the product development - described it as follows:
Someone comes along and says: “I have an idea,  a  proposal.”  We  say:  “Fine.  Could  you
make a sort of proposal?” At the next meeting of the development group we call that  person
in and have him explain  his idea and have a discussion.
The proposal is a rather simple business plan, based on a rapid pre-investigation regarding project  feasibility
and the potential costs and benefits for the organization. It is interesting to note that ideas proposed are not necessarily
evaluated from their economic perspective. The development group  sets  priorities  based  on  their  understanding  of
what is most important for the company and on the available resources. The same person told us:
I  wish  I  could  say  that  we  have  a  nice  formalized  system,  that  we   calculate   certain
parameters, etc. But in fact we have not, we do  not:  it  is  all  ‘gut  feeling’.  We  obviously
calculate such things as expected costs and benefits; we try to assess what is the market  size
of the new products, at what price it can be sold, etc. But every project is evaluated in  itself.
We do not have a formal system. We try  very  much  to  work  out  ourselves  a  consensual
decision. Then, again, we are all basically experts.
The high level of skills of all  the  people  involved  turns  the  absence  of  this  evaluation
system into a flexible feature of the organization. Although there is usually general  agreement  on
the choices made, the CEO’s opinion is the prevailing one in case consensus is not reached.  Since
most of the members of the development group are not directly involved in  day-to-day  activities,
assistance is provided by the Review group which is composed of  four  persons  from  marketing,
software, sales, and information technology. The role of this group  is  to  review  short  and  long-
term  plans and programs twice a year.
This system facilitates the continuous  reorganization  of  the  company  resources  since  it
gives rise to initiatives that may ultimately lead to substantial changes in strategies and  products.
An informal and open culture encourages the spontaneous initiatives of groups or individuals.  As
the CEO said: :
Even  though  sometimes  projects  are  initiated  by  the  management  group,  most  of   the
projects actually start because a person or a group of people have had what they think  is  a
good idea and want to realize it. A group of engineers and  marketing  people  may  want  to
develop a project: they do some skunk work and then they may come to  us  and  say:  “Hey,
do you want to see what we can do? Here we have a sort of prototype...” And  hopefully  we
will say: “That sounds like a fantastic idea, why don’t you do  that?”  And  they  are  ready:
the group is already there.
This statement reflects an organization culture that is open to  dispersed  individual  contributions  and  helps
sustain continuous innovation through the reorganization of existing resource combinations. Individual knowledge  is,
in fact, the seed that generates innovative ideas and an  open  mind  represents  the  most  fertile  ground.  The  ancient
Latin motto cogitate incognita is the emblematic company vision displayed on almost every floor of
the company headquarters and subsidiaries to remind employees of the constant need to “think the
unthinkable” in order to  go beyond current practices and ideas and strive for greater innovation.
To sum up, our study suggests that Oticon’s capacity to  continuously  reorganize  patterns
of knowledge embodied in products and activities rests on a loosely-coupled architecture based on
the absence of permanent formal structures, multiple and evolving relational patterns, and an open
and informal culture. Oticon’s architecture does not offer  only  a  favorable  environment  for  the
continuous emergence of creativity at the individual and organizational  level,  it  also  performs  a
fundamental  role  in  keeping  the   structure   open   to   further   reconfiguration   of   specialized
knowledge patterns. A fundamental feature of these arrangements,  however,  is  the  simultaneous
presence  of   elements   of   rationality   and   indeterminacy   in   the   fundamental   coordination
mechanisms  and  processes  of  the  organization   which   ensures   coordination   despite   ample
individual  freedom  and  indeterminacy  of  the  role  system.  At   Oticon,   coordinating   all   the
innovative  efforts  in  one  specific  strategic   direction   is   the   primary   responsibility   of   the
development group. Although project leaders enjoy a high degree of freedom  in  using  the  funds
they receive, they, in fact, operate within the  framework  established  by  the  development  group
through the communication of priorities and the centralized  allocation  of  financial  resources.  In
this respect, a loose architecture – that is, the capacity  to  preserve  elements  of  determinacy  and
spontaneous self-design in the mechanisms and processes that coordinate the development process
– supports the continuity of the innovative process fueled by knowledge creation  and  absorption,
and knowledge integration. Figure 4 shows the fundamental elements of this capability.
Discussion and conclusions
The purpose of  this  study  was  to  improve  our  understanding  of  dynamic  capabilities.
Almost ten years after the theoretical diffusion of  this  concept  (Teece  and  Pisano,  1994),  little
empirical evidence has supported this fundamental organizational concept. In the article  we  have
presented  and  discussed  a  longitudinal  case  study  of  a  leading  company  in  the   hearing-aid
industry, Oticon A/S, which demonstrated an outstanding ability to sustain continuous innovation.
The company  seemed  to  provide  an  appropriate  setting  even  because,  from  the  longitudinal
analysis, it was possible to establish the starting point of the new product  sequencing  (introduced
in the ‘90s) that allowed Oticon to become profitable again and largely regain its market  position.
In the next pages, we discuss the main findings of our exploratory analysis.
The  first  result  of  Oticon’s  in  depth  study  indicates  that  in  order  to  sustain  product
innovation a firm must build dynamic  capabilities  that  allow  the  simultaneous  and  continuous
creation, absorption,  and  integration  of  knowledge.  At  Oticon,  knowledge  creation  is  deeply
rooted  in  the  concept  of  a  long-term  commitment  to  creating  scientific  knowledge   through
investments in a unique research center with a world reputation for pursuing scientific  knowledge
in  the  acoustic,  audiology,  and  psychoacoustic  fields.  This  capability  allows  the  continuous
creation and absorption of new knowledge without which no product innovation can  be  sustained
in  the  long  run.  Moreover,  a  peculiar  project-based  structure  promotes  the   combination   of
knowledge components dispersed within the organization  by  transforming  specialized  scientific
and technical knowledge into new products. It is important to highlight that the relevance of  these
processes is confirmed by  past  research  on  product  innovation.  Knowledge  creation  has  been
emphasized  in  some  empirical  studies   focusing   on   experimentation   (e.g.,   Henderson   and
Cockburn, 1994; Pisano, 1994). As  maintained  by  Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1990),  the  ability  to
acquire knowledge is directly related to the presence of previous related knowledge, meaning  that
firms  must  already  have  invested  in  technical  knowledge  if  they  want  to  benefit  from   the
knowledge they absorb. Likewise, Oticon’s strong commitment to  the  scientific  community  has
become a way to continuously exchange knowledge with the outside environment. The case of the
pharmaceutical industry shows how academic  publications  by  company  researchers  allows  the
industry to acquire important knowledge  (Henderson e Cockburn, 1994). Our case  study  extends
this  literature  by  showing  that  effective  integration  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  the  structural
organization  of  the  product  development  process.  In  order  to  facilitate  integration  it  is  also
essential  to  go  beyond  structural  arrangements  and  eliminate  physical  and   cultural   barriers
between experts from different departments and “professional families”. Most  of  all,  the  Oticon
findings show  us  that  it  is  the  co-presence,  that  is  the  conjoint  use  of  knowledge  creation,
absorption, and knowledge integration that provides the very foundation of continuous innovation.
The  second  result  emphasizes  that,  in  the  long  run,  sustaining  continuous  innovation
requires a further dynamic capability. If  a  company  wants  to  sequence  product  innovations,  it
must create a context that spurs creativity  from  all  parts  of  the  organization  at  any  time.  The
theory of dynamic capabilities has already shown the relevance of continuous learning in order  to
introduce new product innovations and adapt  to  changing  market  conditions.  This  idea  is  also
consistent with the fact that “core  capabilities”  can  transform  themselves  into  “core  rigidities”
(Leonard Barton, 1992).  Product  sequencing  can  be  seen  as  the  consequence  of  a  structured
system of core and integrative knowledge which, by itself,  depends  upon  continuous,  individual
and collective learning within  the  organization  (Helfat  and  Raubitschek,  2000).  Similarly,  the
problem-solving activity of an organization involved in continuous product development is  at  the
basis of the creation of specialized and integrated knowledge aimed at  developing  and  launching
new products (Iansiti and Clark, 1994). The study of  Oticon  offers  empirical  evidence  of  these
theoretical ideas and  improves  our  understanding  of  how  systems  of  learning  actually  work.
Oticon has, in fact, shaped an  organizational  context  that  allows  individual  and  organizational
creativity to emerge.  Moreover,  it  provides  a  framework  showing  how  the  way  organization
culture, systems and structures are managed enables the company to tap dispersed knowledge  and
stimulate local creativity. The specific ability to shape such an organizational context represents  a
necessary complement in order to focus on autonomous scientific  research  and  permit  scientific
and technical knowledge to become integrated into specific product development projects.
This context seems to rest on a loosely-coupled  arrangement  as  the  distribution  of  tasks
and resources is not strictly regulated by the designed structure. It is rather the interplay of  people
at all levels who possess the ability to  identify  resources  and  combine  them  in  new  ways  and
continuously  redesign  the  organization  by  redistributing  roles,  tasks  and  responsibilities.   At
Oticon, the development  group  coordinates  activities  by  allocating  resources  among  different
projects and defining the strategic context that orients the project initiatives and guides the overall
process of change. The process  of  setting  priorities  and  reviewing  projects  carried  out  by  the
development  group  directs  the  combination  and  recombination  of  dispersed  knowledge   that
results in autonomous strategic initiatives. However, the centralized management of the process of
strategic context determination leaves ample room  for  the  decentralized  allocation  of  resources
like time, attention and skills that is  left  to  individual  initiative  and  collective  negotiation.  An
important consequence of the latter is the substantial indeterminacy of individual positions  within
the organization. The roles of the Oticon employees are not  defined  a  priori  but  are  continually
redefined according to  their  changing  job  portfolio  which  reflects  the  changing  needs  of  the
organization and the evolution of their skills and inclinations. As a matter of fact,  the  structure  is
not super-imposed on the flow of the process, as occurs in a  tightly  coupled  organization,  but  is
defined at any time by the  allocation  of  people,  resources  and  tasks  among  the  projects.  The
division of labor, therefore, changes continually, as people take part in new projects, develop  new
skills and eventually redefine their roles.  In  this  sense,  the  structure  is  continually  reproduced
according  to  the  current  needs  and  emerges  from  the  interaction  between  people   initiating,
running and taking part in the projects. It is this continual  interaction,  and  not  a  pre-determined
plan or design, that determines the allocation of time, resources and attention,  and  ultimately  the
structure of the organization.
The  third  result  of  the  Oticon  analysis  shows  that  each  dynamic  capability   actually
leverages company resources, especially those regarding human and physical resources, structures
and systems, and company culture. In order to be effective, each capability must  be  composed  of
these four resources which must also be designed to be coherent and fit their task perfectly.  These
four  organizational  resources  therefore  represent  the  building  blocks  of   product   innovation
although it is the dynamic capability that leverages them and leads to new  product  creation.  Past
studies showed  the  relevance  of  each  of  the  four  variables.  Culture  has  been  considered  an
essential resource in strategic  processes  (Barney,  1986),  and  has  also  been  considered  a  core
capability for product innovation (Nonaka, 1994; Leonard Barton, 1992).  Likewise,  the  presence
of incentive systems has also been considered an important tool to spur new product  development
(Cockburn, Henderson, Stern, 2000). There is also evidence on the importance of individual  skills
in giving rise to product innovation  (Leonard  Barton,  1995;  Iansiti,  1997).  However,  what  we
discovered from the Oticon experience is that the four organizational  resources  must  coexist  and
be coherent in order to generate competitive advantage through continuous innovation. Let us take
the case of the dynamic capability that we called Knowledge creation and absorption.  The  Oticon
ability in scientific knowledge absorption is deeply rooted not only  in  the  superior  physical  and
human resources of the firm, but  also  in  the  structural,  managerial  and,  to  some  extent,  even
“cultural” autonomy which the research center enjoys. Earlier in the  paper  we  have  shown  how
these building blocks  are  tightly  connected:  how,  for  instance,  loose  connection  between  the
center and  the  company  helped  to  introduce  Eriksholm  in  academic  networks  of  knowledge
creation; how this network of relations  facilitated  the  exchange  of  information  and  the  further
accumulation of knowledge about audiology and psychoacustics; how  this  knowledge  guided  to
the development of processing sounds in digital hearing aids.
While  past  studies  have  repeatedly  indicated  the  need  for   consistency   between   the
elements of a firm, such as its structure, its strategy, its culture (Miller and Friesen,  1980;  Drazin
and Van de  Ven,  1985;  Siggelkov,  2002),  literature  on  capabilities  has  privileged  individual
resources and structures. Building on evidence from our study, we argue that dynamic capabilities
are not the individual resources, practices or structures that characterize new product development
or strategic decision making, but the higher order knowledge-related processes that are  performed
through these combination of elements. A dynamic capability can therefore be  represented  as  an
“organizational mix” – i.e., each dynamic capability can be seen as a mix that makes up  the  main
organizational  resources  of  the  firm.  The  specific  composition  and  correct  weighting  of  the
organizational resources (human and physical resources, structure and systems,  and  culture)  thus
creates a peculiar organizational formula regarded as the idiosyncratic  dynamic  capability.  What
changes in the formation of each capability is the content of the  specific  organizational  variables
and the way in which they combine the variables themselves. Since each  firm  is  naturally  based
on different capabilities, each necessarily has  different  dynamic  capabilities  based  on  different
organizational mixes.
It is important to highlight that this feature  denotes  a  profound  change  in  the  design  of
organizational  variables.  Traditionally,  the  design  of  the  organizational  structure,  managerial
systems and culture, was aimed at consistency between the  firm  and  the  market  (Lawrence  and
Lorsch, 1997). The most recent theories have taken insights from the theory of transaction costs in
terms of the opportunism of economic actors and investment specificity (Williamson, 1975). Even
these theories, however, have always aimed to find an organizational fit between the company and
the environment  (Grandori,  1987).  As  described  by  Chandler  (1963),  in  the  development  of
American firms,  organizational  designers  have  opted  for  functional  structures  in  the  case  of
limited market complexity, and divisional structures in the case  of  greater  complexity  and  little
synergy among the core businesses. The product/market (that is,  the  strategic  business  unit)  has
therefore always been at the core of organizational design. The shift in  the  emphasis  to  dynamic
capabilities  shows  that  contemporary  organizational  design  has  to  focus  on  the  creation   of
mixes that can foster company resources. In other words,  organizational  design  must  create  and
sustain the competencies through which the firm  continuously  acts  on  the  market.  Human  and
physical resources, structure and systems, and culture should thus  be  combined  to  stimulate  the
dynamic capabilities through which the firm generates and  sustains  competitive  advantage.  It  is
not simply by chance that the last ten years have  seen  a  progressive  movement  from  functional
and divisional structures focused on  products/markets  towards  structures  that  value  customers,
management  processes  and  business  projects  (Clark  and  Wheelwright,   1993;   Hammer   and
Champy, 1993).
In  conclusion,  by  describing  the   dynamic   capabilities   that   enhance   the   ability   to
continuously  innovate,  the  study  contributes  to  shedding  light  on   the   complex   process   of
adaptation that  must  take  place  at  the  organizational  level  whenever  firms  face  a  change  in
technological and  market  conditions.  Although  the  emerging  model  is  based  on  the  specific
experience of Oticon, we believe that the combination of  the  three  knowledge-related  processes
and the resources they leverage, may provide  a  more  analytical  and  systemic  framework.  This
framework may now be amenable to quantitative investigation across a wider range of  companies
and industries.
In changing  environments,  technological  development  and  the  imitative  or  innovative
behavior of competitors quickly erode competitive  advantage  created  through  innovation.  As  a
consequence, firms are continually  engaged  in  a  process  of  creative  destruction  (Schumpeter,
1934) that calls for a periodic reconfiguration of basic patterns of integration that are embodied  in
products and market  strategies.  This  paper  identifies  the  three  dynamic  capabilities  and  their
resource-based nature as an important basis for continuous innovation. In addition to  contributing
to the emerging literature on continuous innovation, the capabilities we mentioned also  contribute
to the Resource-based View of the Firm  by  pointing  out  new  issues  not  previously  identified.
Since “a fuller appreciation of the origins  of  competitive  advantage  is  to  be  found  in  a  better
analytical and empirical understanding of the managerial processes which allows some firms to be
ahead and stay ahead of the game” (Cockburn, Henderson, Stern,  2000,  p.  1142),  we  hope  that
this  study  has  contributed  to  clarifying  the  nature  and  content  of  some   of   these   valuable
managerial processes.
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Table 1. Competitive and financial results of Oticon over a 10-year period.*
|              |1988   |1989                                             |
|MultiFocus    |1992   |First fully automatic non-linear amplifier       |
| Personic     |1992   |Pleasant design and surface texture, and wide    |
|              |       |color range to harmonize with facial features    |
|Oticon 4 kids |1993   |Colors and design more appealing and easy-to-wear|
|              |       |for kids                                         |
|MultiFocus    |1994   |Same quality of sound processing, smaller size;  |
|Mild          |       |designed for younger users                       |
|MicroFocus    |1995   |First programmable instrument, based on analog   |
|              |       |amplification process                            |
|DigiFocus     |1996   |First 100% digital hearing aid                   |
|DigiLife      |1997   |Simpler and faster fitting principle,            |
|              |       |programmable via a portable unit                 |
Figure 1. Unbundling dynamic capabilities: the knowledge-based processes at Oticon.
Figure 2. The building blocks of Knowledge creation and absorption at Oticon.
Figure 3. The building blocks of Knowledge integration at Oticon.
Figure 4. The building blocks of Knowledge reconfiguration at Oticon.
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* The paper greatly benefited from the  insightful  suggestions  of  Anna  Grandori,  Nicolai  Foss,
Rebecca Henderson, and Salvio Vicari. Other relevant suggestions were made by  the  participants
in the 1999 Academy of Management Conference, Chicago, and  the  2001  Industrial  Economics
and Organizational Theory seminars organized  at  the  Copenhagen  Business  Schools.  The  two
authors, however, take full responsibility for the ideas contained in the paper.
[1] As it has been described by Teece and collegue in  one  of  their  paper:  “the  term  “dynamic”
refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve congruence  with  changing  business
environments (…). The term “capabilities” emphasizes the key  role  of  strategic  management  in
appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and  external  organizational  skills,
resources, and functional competences to  match  the  requirements  of  a  changing  environment”
(Teece,  Pisano,  Shuen,  1997:  515).  In  this  way,  the  theory   of   dynamic   capabilities   helps
overcoming the  main  limits  of  the  resource-based  View  which  presents  a  model  of  strategy
emphasizing efficiency characterized by a clearly static framework.
[2] For a few exception, see the pioneering research by Iansiti and Clark (1994) and Henderson
(1994).  See  also  works  by  Brown  and  Eisenhardt  (1997),  Tripsas  (1997),   and   Helfat   and
Raubitschak (2002).
[3] See the work by Lee and Lotz (1998) for a detailed analysis of the competitive dynamics in the
industry.
[4]  Oticon’s  CEO  described  a  hearing  aid  itself  as  “a  creative  combination  of   technology,
audiology and psychology”.
[5]  See  Ravasi  and  Verona  (2001)  for  a  detailed  explanation  of  the  knowledge   integration
mechanisms.
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KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND ABSORPTION
Culture
1. Orientation to scientific, rather than applied research
2. Unrestricted exploration of audiological issues
3. Open attitude towards the scientific community: willingness to share research results
Actors
4. Skilled researchers graduated  from Danish universities
5. Long-term relationships with an extensive pool of patients
6. Collaborations with experts from international research centers and universities
Structures and Systems
8. Complete autonomy of the research center director over the use of the annual budget
9. Scientists at the research center focused on base research
10.
Physical resources
11. Separate research facility in an attractive location
12. Comprehensive library on audiology and acoustics
13. The Eriksholm collection museum
KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION
Culture
15. Openness to creativity
16. Absence of departmental identification
17. Interaction and dialogue encouraged
Actors
19. Technical experts loosely affiliated with professional areas
20. Employees with eclectic skills, able to work in an unconventional environment
Structures and  systems
22. Cross-functional teams
23. Competence centers
24. Professional areas
25. “Multi-job” system
26. Hiring mechanisms
27. Self-participation in projects
Physical resources
29. New workplace layout (open space offices, meeting points, coffee counters, etc.)
30. Mobile workstations
31. Easily accessible electronic archive
KNOWLEDGE RECONFIGURATION
Culture
33. Openness to individual proposals and individual creativity
34. Broad involvement in strategic processes
Actors
36. Contributive and motivated employees
37. Experienced senior managers
Physical resources
39. Flexible workplace design
40. Cogitate incognita on the company walls
Structures and Systems
42. Absence of departments
43. Development group
44. Continuous collection and evaluation of proposals
45. Free allocation of time and skills
46. CentralIzed allocation of financial resources
Knowledge    Integration
CONTINUOUS INNOVATION
Knowledge Reconfiguration
Knowledge Creation
and Absorption
